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How the Biological/Social Divide Limits Disability 
and Equality 
Martha T. McCluskey  
INTRODUCTION 
What is disability? That question has been central to the struggle 
for substantive justice for people with disabilities. The standard 
approach focuses on sorting social function from biological status to 
determine ―real‖ disadvantage. However, this division confines and 
confuses prevailing visions of equality not only for disability but also 
for race, gender, and sexual orientation.  
To advance disability rights, advocates have often sought to 
replace a medical model of disability with a model of disability as 
socially constructed.
1
 That revised framework presents disability 
inequality as a problem not of inherent physiological limitation but of 
social disparagement analogous to race discrimination.
2
 For both race 
and disability, prejudice creates irrelevant biological differences as 
marks of inferior identity, legitimating systematic sociolegal 
penalties. Despite broad acceptance of the idea that inequality is 
partly a social problem,
3
 most theory and law continues to assume 
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 1. For an explanation of the medical and social models of disability, and how the social 
model helped shape a civil rights perspective on disability, see Mary Crossley, The Disability 
Kaleidescope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 653–62 (1999). 
 2. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (2004) 
(explaining the development of a disability rights movement focused on antidiscrimination). 
 3. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1251, 1252 (2007) (questioning how the social model has come to be seen as the 
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that inequality in the context of disability also stems from real 
biological disadvantages that can be eliminated only through 
affirmative accommodation of difference. The persisting, central 
division between social and biological causes of disability has 
developed into a bind that impedes meaningful analysis and reform of 
injustice. 
This Article examines two separate areas marked by controversy 
over the legal definition of ―disability‖: workers‘ compensation and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (―ADA‖).4 These two areas 
appear to take opposing approaches. In workers‘ compensation, law 
reforms have emphasized a medical definition, while prominent ADA 
jurisprudence has rejected a medical model in favor of social context 
(until recent statutory reforms).  
Despite this superficial divergence, both legal regimes converge to 
reinforce the disadvantageous status of disability. The choice 
between biological status or social function in disability law echoes 
the choice of equal treatment versus special treatment of gender 
―difference‖ in traditional equality doctrine long criticized by 
feminist legal theorists.
5
 The equal-treatment principle focuses on 
ignoring irrelevant gender-based differences as the way to overcome 
disadvantages linked to gender.
6
 Conversely, the special-treatment 
principle focuses on recognizing and responding to gender-based 
differences as the way to overcome gender inequality.
7
  
 
foundation of disability civil rights). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (Supp. 2009). 
 5. For a discussion of the equal versus special treatment dilemma in feminist theory, see 
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the Maternity and the 
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142–44 (1986). See also Martha T. McCluskey, 
Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in Public Transportation, 97 
YALE L.J. 863, 870–73 (1988) (comparing feminist critiques of the equal-special treatment 
division to disability discrimination law prior to the ADA).  
 6. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 352–70 (1985) 
(explaining the advantages of and equal treatment approach to discrimination against pregnant 
women). 
 7. See Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 513, 518–22 (1983) (arguing for affirmative sex-based protection of pregnant women in 
the workplace) . 
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This seemingly logical choice presents a double bind for gender 
equality.
8
 Either way, women lose, as Catharine MacKinnon argued, 
because whether women are treated the same as men or different 
from men, this framework positions men as the standard against 
which women are measured.
9
 For example, a classic equal treatment-
special treatment dilemma asked whether women workers with 
family care responsibilities should be treated as equal to traditional 
working men or different from those men. In response, feminists 
argued that gender equality would be better advanced by asking 
whether the workplace normally should be structured to assume 
workers have little or no family caretaking responsibilities.
10
  
This problem of covert biased norms underlying the sameness-
difference dilemma extends to other kinds of status hierarchies. 
African American boys, for instance, or transgendered youth, or 
working mothers may constitute groups whose particular gendered 
interests and identities are interpreted as deviations from an unstated 
and normalized gender baseline in certain contexts. By implicitly 
accepting that particular needs or interests count as disadvantageous 
―differences,‖ in contrast to an assumed baseline in which a specific 
characteristic is normal and normative, either a sameness or a 
difference-based approach will be likely to reinforce a status-based 
hierarchy.  
The double bind of the equal treatment-special treatment 
framework is repeated in the choice between defining disability as a 
problem of biological status or a problem of social functioning. A 
particular physiological condition can be treated as an essential 
disadvantage precluding productive functioning or as a tangential 
social contingency that can be overcome through productive 
functioning. Either way, disadvantages of disability are constructed 
 
 8. See Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 115, 122–26 (1999) (comparing the equal-special treatment 
framework to the bad choices constructed by the efficiency-redistribution division). 
 9. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 221 
(1989). 
 10. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–3 (2000) (analyzing the problem of combining market work and 
family responsibilities as the result of problematic gender ideology and institutional structures 
separating a sphere of domesticity from market work). 
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against assumed and often covert baselines of normal and normative 
social and biological functioning that, to a large extent, legitimate the 
inequality of disability.  
As Martha Fineman argues in the context of gender, obsession 
with the origins of difference—is it biological or social?—diverts 
attention from the effects of difference.
11
 Categorizing difference 
along this divide has little benefit for efforts to reduce the 
disadvantages of ―difference,‖ because both biology and society can 
be amenable to or resistant to change; both are subject to political and 
moral interpretation.
12
 In the case of disability, as with gender, the 
positivist inquiry into what the relevant difference is cannot be 
separated from the normative inquiry into what the relevant 
difference should be.  
The focus on separating essential from contingent difference—
whether of gender or disability—implicitly reinforces the idea of 
―true‖ difference as non-ideological and non-political. Any harms (or 
benefits) associated with that difference then appear natural and 
normal rather than unjust. The diverging definitions of disability in 
workers‘ compensation and ADA law exemplify how the legal focus 
on sorting out social from biological, regardless of which is chosen as 
―most real,‖ begs the deeper questions about when the disadvantages 
of difference should be understood as public injustice. That is, the 
underlying question of inequality should not be who is really 
different or whose real differences deserve special accommodation. 
Instead, we must ask whose potentially disadvantageous differences 
are systematically privileged as public concerns deserving public 
support and whose are penalized as private problems.  
Part I of this Article outlines the standard division of equality into 
two scales, one formal and one substantive, and explains how a 
problematic division between biological identity and social 
functioning has been used to support these scales and to rank 
disability, race, and gender.  
Part II turns to the example of workers‘ compensation law reforms 
to criticize what appears to be a medical approach to defining 
 
 11. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 34–35 (1995).  
 12. Id. at 35. 
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disability. Part III examines the contrasting social approach to 
disability in the ADA rulings, showing the similar flaws of this 
slippery attempt to focus on social functioning separate from 
biological status. The Article concludes that by rejecting a focus on 
sorting biological from social cause of disability‘s disadvantage, we 
might better advance equality.  
I. EQUALITY THEORY  
A. Formal Equality’s Hierarchy: Race, Gender, and Disability  
1. Correcting the Disadvantages of Irrelevant Difference 
In the classic legal antidiscrimination paradigm, inequality is a 
formal problem of distinguishing sameness from difference.
13
 The 
traditional equality doctrine focuses on weeding out false or irrational 
correlations between formal biological difference and functional 
sameness.
14
 That formal equality paradigm produces a hierarchy of 
equality protection, whereby the difference of race gets the greatest 
legal protection (strict scrutiny),
15
 sex gets an intermediate level of 
protection,
16
 and disability a lesser level of protection (rational basis 
review).
17
 That ranking follows from the assumption that the apparent 
physical differences of race are almost never rationally related to 
functional difference, while the physical differences of gender are 
sometimes relevant, and the physical differences of disability are 
often relevant. In other words, formal equal protection increases as 
biological difference decreases.
18
  
In this scheme, discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or 
disability is ―legitimate‖ if based on function rather than physical 
 
 13. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) 
(denying heightened scrutiny for disadvantageous treatment of mental disability on the theory 
that equal protection directs ―that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike‖). 
 14. Id. at 478 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
 15. Id. at 440.  
 16. Id. at 440–44.  
 17. Id. at 446.  
 18. Id. at 440–44 (distinguishing the legal treatment of the ―real and undeniable‖ 
differences of mental retardation from usually irrelevant and prejudice-based differences of race 
and frequently irrelevant differences of gender). 
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form, fact rather than value. The move from race to disability on this 
scale marks a move from weaker to greater relationship between 
merely formal appearances of difference and the functional 
socioeconomic reality of different ability. Because this scale assumes 
functional differences are potentially measurable facts, differentiating 
on the basis of functional characteristics appears rational. 
Differentiations based on pure status—apart from function—appear 
irrational, because maintaining status divorced from functional 
purpose is assumed to be an unreasonable and illegitimate 
government purpose.  
On this traditional scale, because disability differences are most 
―real‖—or most behavioral-differentiation based on disability appears 
least likely to involve irrationality or problematic value judgments 
such as hostility or subordination for its own sake.
19
 This Article‘s 
goal is not to defend disability‘s place at the bottom of this hierarchy, 
but rather to counter the retrenchment of disability rights (and of 
equality more broadly) by returning to the earlier critical project of 
challenging this hierarchy and the equality paradigm that produces it. 
2. The Social Substance of Formal Biological Difference  
Critical analysis of the problem of race and sex inequality has 
shifted the focus from formal difference to substantive 
subordination.
20
 Feminist critiques of the choice between equal and 
different treatment have been part of a broader effort to explore the 
disparate substantive effects of facially neutral treatment.
21
 In a social 
 
 19. Id. at 443 (explaining that the presence of relevant immutable functional difference in 
the context of disability and the history of legislative protection makes prejudice unlikely). For 
a critique of this analysis, see McCluskey, supra note 5, at 868–70. 
 20. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 11–14 (2003) (discussing 
historical support for the antisubordination interpretation); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1986) (advocating 
a move from antidifferentiation to antisubordination as the framework for equality law); Owen 
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107–08 (1976) 
(distinguishing between an anticlassification approach to equal protection and an 
antisubordination approach). 
 21. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 20, at 141–46 (1976) (advocating extending equal protection 
to disparate impact on the theory that the problem of inequality is systemic harm not simply 
misclassification). 
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historical context in which unequal treatment of a particular identity 
becomes systematically and pervasively entrenched in institutions, 
culture, and policies, it is logical to expect that inequality on the basis 
of such an identity would come to appear natural, rational, and 
neutral.
22
 This means a narrow focus on formal equality will be less 
effective the more severe the problem of unjust inequality.  
The seemingly formal task of determining sameness and 
difference always requires reference to a substantive purpose. 
Whether a table is really the same as or different from a chair or a cat 
depends on whether the purpose of the categorization is, for instance, 
to sell furniture or to collect one person‘s belongings. As Martha 
Minow wrote in her analysis of disability discrimination and equality, 
difference always exists in the social context of relationship rather 
than as either an essential status or functional fact inherent in an 
individual.
23
 Inequality creates real difference as much as real 
difference creates inequality.  
Strict judicial scrutiny for explicit governmental racial 
discrimination gets its logic not solely from the formal principle of 
―treating likes alike,‖ but also from substantive judgments about the 
relative harm of racial classification compared to other 
classifications, or about the relative harms of racial exclusion 
compared to alleged harms of racial integration.
24
 Further, strict 
scrutiny doctrine rests on substantive judgments about when 
discrimination should be categorized as related to or separate from 
―race‖ and when racial discrimination should be categorized as 
caused by or separate from government action.
25
  
 
 22. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC‘Y 635, 654 (1983) (discussing 
how hostility toward women becomes routine rationality); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 
1986 Term: Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 68 (1987) (―Power is at its 
peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes serious 
challenges from discussion or even imagination.‖). 
 23. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 1–4, 22 (1990).  
 24. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 34 (1959) (identifying the substantive normative judgments inevitable to constitutional 
rulings desegregating schools); Finley, supra note 5, at 1150 (explaining in the context of sex 
discrimination that formal equality analysis is indeterminate without substantive judgments 
about ultimate social aims). 
 25. For example, compare the majority opinion and dissent in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:109 
 
 
Similarly, turning to disability, if a person with paraplegia is 
excluded from a public bus with steps, we must go beyond simple 
fact and formal logic to conclude that this exclusion results from 
―real difference‖ rather than from false stereotype. Judgments about 
whether that person is ―really‖ different from people who can climb 
up bus steps depend on what we consider the substantive purpose of 
the bus: transportation for the public, or transportation for members 
of the public who can climb steps? Determining whether the 
exclusion at issue is neutral treatment with disadvantageous effects 
on those who are ―different‖ or biased treatment based on prejudice 
against persons with disabilities depends not on the physiological fact 
of a particular mobility limitation, but on substantive moral and 
political decisions about whether buses should normally and naturally 
be designed for entrance via steps rather than by ramps or lifts.
26
  
Such facially neutral decisions can represent and reinforce 
assumptions of unequal status and animus just as effectively as overt 
expressions of hostility directed at physical difference. Feminist 
critique has argued that a society in which mothers count as normally 
productive workers would treat employment leave for childbirth and 
childcare as normal and neutral to productive work rather than as a 
special accommodation.
27
 Similarly, a society that viewed wheelchair 
users, stroller users, or shopping-cart pushers as important or normal 
examples of the general public for whom public services should be 
designed might normally and cost-effectively construct transportation 
systems free of steps.
28
 Disability law scholarship has similarly 
analyzed how substantive accommodations can overlap with formal 
neutral treatment,
29
 rendering the normative distinction between 
 
U.S. 717, 749–52, 761–62 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing about whether racial 
segregation of Detroit schools stemmed from government racial policies). 
 26. McCluskey, supra note 5, at 872–73. 
 27. Finley, supra note 5, at 1168.  
 28. McCluskey, supra note 5, at 873. 
 29. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 
698 (2001) (showing that the standard antidiscrimination law sometimes imposes substantive 
requirements similar to the ADA‘s reasonable accommodation requirement). See generally 
Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination 
Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861 (2004) (analyzing the similarity between removal of social 
barriers through reasonable accommodations and removal of barriers through equal treatment); 
McCluskey, supra note 5, at 878–80 (arguing that disability discrimination doctrine should treat 
accommodations for disabilities as a form of the disparate impact approach to 
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formal protection against discrimination and substantive 
accommodation ultimately shaky.
30
 
Given the inevitably substantive nature of formal equality, some 
critics have argued that moving from antidiscrimination to 
antisubordination would explicitly address rather than avoid the 
competing substantive values necessarily at issue.
31
 Yet the effort to 
advance substantive equality by identifying and remedying 
substantive subordination often has ironically tightened rather than 
loosened the biological versus social bind. 
B. Substantive Equality’s Hierarchy: Disability, Gender, and Race 
1. Correcting the Disadvantages of Real and Relevant Difference  
Courts sometimes have applied formal equality doctrine with a 
vigorously critical eye toward uncovering the substantive judgments 
underlying claims of functional and natural differences.
32
 However, 
instead of pushing the boundaries of formal equality further toward 
open and careful analysis of its entanglement with substantive results, 
substantive equality has largely gained ground as a separate approach 
focused on alleviating the harmful disadvantages of ―real‖ difference. 
By largely reinscribing rather than resisting the dichotomy between 
formal equal treatment and substantive accommodation of individual 
difference, this expanded substantive equality framework helps 
narrow both formal equality and substantive equality.  
The ADA‘s reasonable accommodation requirement is a 
paradigmatic example of an explicitly substantive approach to 
equality. In the mainstream view, this accommodation requirement is 
largely distinct from and opposed to antidiscrimination principles, 
 
antidiscrimination); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004). 
 30. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 830–31 (2003). 
 31. See Colker, supra note 20; Fiss, supra note 20.  
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–33 (1996) (scrutinizing sex-
based exclusion from a state educational institution for overgeneralization, ties to historically 
suspect gender ideology, post-hoc rationalization, and closeness of fit between means and 
ends).  
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tracking the special versus equal treatment divide.
33
 Conventional 
wisdom holds that accommodation involves different treatment, in 
response to functionally relevant differences, while 
antidiscrimination involves similar treatment, reflecting ―blindness‖ 
to difference.  
In the conventional model of substantive equality, legal protection 
increases with increased biological difference, reversing the hierarchy 
of formal equality. Disability is typically ranked as the most 
deserving of substantive protection; gender is in the middle, and race 
is the least deserving of substantive protection.
34
 In the standard 
view, the differences of disability commonly involve ―real‖ limits on 
substantive social functioning, making accommodation, rather than 
antidiscrimination, the more appropriate approach to addressing 
disadvantages of disability. Similarly, because the differences of 
gender are conventionally assumed to involve a mixture of ―real‖ 
functional differences and ―false‖ social stereotypes, gender equality 
can logically require a mixture of accommodation and 
antidiscrimination protections. Finally, the standard view holds that 
affirmative accommodation of racial difference is almost never 
appropriate, because this view assumes the differences of race are 
almost never a matter of ―real‖ functional limits.  
Following this substantive hierarchy, the ADA focuses centrally 
on accommodation as the leading legal strategy for promoting 
equality in the context of disability. For gender equality, 
requirements for substantive accommodation such as the Family and 
Medical Leave Act
35
 have gained a place alongside traditional civil 
rights laws as a means to alleviating functional differences related to 
gender. In the context of racial equality, however, recent doctrine has 
sharply limited explicit (and perhaps implicit) accommodation of 
 
 33. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin A. Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 307, 311 (2001) (grounding analysis of ADA in an assumption that its reasonable 
accommodation requirement is in tension with antidiscrimination principles).  
 34. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41, 446 (1985). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2006) (requiring employers to provide up to twelve weeks of 
unpaid leave for certain family and medical reasons). 
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race-based differences to achieve substantive outcomes, even in the 
face of morally or politically compelling substantive purposes.
36
  
2. The Biological Form of Substantive Dominance  
Critics of substantive approaches to equality argue that claims of 
beneficial response to ―real‖ difference have long rationalized some 
of the worst injustices in the context of race, gender, and disability.
37
 
Distinguishing benign from malign accommodation of difference is 
just as subject to contested and covert substantive judgments as 
distinguishing between ―real‖ and ―false‖ difference. If one assumes 
a history and context of systemic, normalized prejudice and 
institutionalized subordination, laws claiming to correct substantive 
dominance actually may serve to entrench that dominance 
(intentionally or accidentally).  
This separate and reversed scale of substantive equality addresses 
the dilemma of substantive dominance by returning to the same 
formalistic division between biological and sociological difference 
that masks the substantive bias it is supposed to solve. In the standard 
analysis, benign and malign recognition of difference is least likely to 
be confused in the case of disability, somewhat more likely in the 
case of gender, and most likely in the case of race. As this framework 
presumes the disadvantages of disability represent ―real‖ functional 
limitations rather than systematic hostility, accommodations to 
compensate or mitigate these disadvantages will seem less likely to 
create harmful stigmas or constructions of difference. In contrast, this 
framework assumes that accommodations aimed at compensating or 
mitigating disadvantages associated with race (or at reconstructing 
alleged ―disadvantages‖ into productive ―diversity‖) will be more 
likely to produce than to prevent harmful differentiation. Because this 
standard view assumes racial disadvantages primarily result from 
socially stigmatizing and stereotyping racial differences, any social 
 
 36. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
748 (2007) (ruling that voluntary school integration plans violated equal protection). 
 37. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (holding that 
strict scrutiny applies to all race classifications regardless of purpose, because ―it may not 
always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign‖ (citations omitted)). See generally 
Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99 (1989). 
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―intervention‖ to alleviate (or celebrate) racial difference is likely to 
further reinforce those social perceptions of functional inferiority.  
Disability‘s position at the top of the substantive equality 
hierarchy has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of stronger and 
more substantive support for disability equality than for race or 
gender equality. That conclusion assumes too simplistically that the 
scale values rather than shortchanges equality.
38
 By linking the most 
substantive equality with the identity most identified with individual 
biological status, the substantive scale targets the most substantive 
protection to the seemingly most privatized and naturalized 
constraints. The scale identifies unequal status primarily with 
constrained autonomy and then further identifies individual biology 
as the clearest substantive constraint on that autonomy. This 
emphasis on individual biology therefore appears to make equality a 
question of separating dependent victims in need of support from 
independent rational actors capable of free choice.
39
  
Framed this way, the substantive equality scale elevates disability 
by reaffirming its subordinated status as an identity of ―real‖ 
victimhood, dependence, and incapacity for rational action. Those 
who really deserve substantive intervention to alleviate disadvantage 
are those whose own choices have not produced that disadvantage. If 
those victims or dependents are deemed really incapable of 
successful functioning (in market, state, or family), however, then the 
substantive intervention they deserve is, by definition, a deviation 
from normally rational processes. By presenting substantive 
accommodations as a way of compensating for ―real‖ and rational 
functional constraints (dependency), this scale defines those 
accommodations as presumptively and essentially irrational (i.e., 
costly and constraining) for society as a whole. For example, in a 
leading analysis of the meaning of substantive equality under the 
ADA, Christine Jolls defines ―accommodation‖ as a requirement that 
 
 38. See, e.g., Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 135 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 39. For a nuanced and insightful analysis of how a feminist focus on substantive 
―dominance‖ became interpreted to equate feminism with women‘s victimization, see Kathryn 
Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 
YALE L.J. 1533, 1552–57 (1994) (reviewing KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR 
AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993)).  
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employers (or others) ―incur special costs in response to the 
distinctive needs (as measured against existing market structures) of 
particular, identifiable demographic groups‖ in circumstances 
without intentional animus based on irrelevant group membership.
40
  
The view of substantive equality as costly support for distinctively 
needy dependents casts the question of substantive accommodations 
as a policy choice to favor ―redistribution‖ over ―efficiency‖ within 
the prevailing economic paradigm.
41
 That paradigm defines 
―efficiency‖ as the functioning of the ―free market‖ presumed to 
normally and naturally produce maximum societal well-being.
42
 In 
this view, formal antidiscrimination law can be compatible with 
―efficiency‖ to the extent it eliminates ―irrational‖ actions with no 
relevance to social function. In contrast, this prevailing economic 
paradigm defines substantive accommodations in response to 
socioeconomic functioning as the ―redistribution‖ of societal 
resources away from overall socioeconomic well-being in order to 
benefit a subset of society: those who are disadvantaged.  
This definitional framework leads to the tautological conclusion 
that substantive accommodations—like those in the ADA—must be 
sharply limited to advance equality as well as other public interests, 
such as economic productivity. If accommodations are defined as 
costly to overall societal well-being, then, by definition, 
accommodations risk increasing rather than redressing inequality. 
Following this circular logic, as the costs of accommodation drain 
other benefits to public welfare, fewer societal resources will be 
available to support costly accommodations. As a result, the 
supposed beneficiaries of substantive accommodations will 
eventually be worse off (along with society in general). Like the 
concept of ―special treatment‖ critiqued in feminist theory, the 
concept of ―redistribution‖ is a way of defining substantive social 
change as normatively harmful based on abnormal individual 
 
 40. Jolls, supra note 29, at 648.  
 41. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 33, at 310–11 (explaining the ADA rulings 
narrowing the definition of disability as the result of the ADA‘s heightened focus on 
redistribution, in tension with antidiscrimination). 
 42. For a critique of the concept of ―efficiency‖ distinct from ―redistribution,‖ see Martha 
T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,” 50 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 657, 716–67 (1998).  
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―difference‖ or ―disadvantage,‖ and only grudgingly available as a 
limited last resort for individuals or groups who cannot help their 
substandard functioning.
43
 Indeed, Samuel Bagenstos has analyzed 
how reducing ―redistributive‖ welfare payments to people with 
disabilities was one of the purposes emphasized by proponents of the 
ADA, and he shows how this anti-dependency purpose sets up an 
inherent tension that sharply limits the law‘s protection even as it 
justifies it.
44
 
In short, disability‘s position at the top of this substantive scale 
means the limitations of disability are presumptively burdensome and 
deserving of correction only if not ―undue.‖45 Although this scale 
decrees that some accommodation is ―due‖ to help overcome the real 
burdens of disability, it also sets up a double bind where the most 
deserving accommodations can appear the most costly. Substantive 
accommodations appear to be ―due‖ particularly to those whose 
functional incapacity appears so severe as to demand unduly undoing 
those functions of society deemed essentially normal and beneficial.
46
 
This bind means that, although the ADA sometimes can bring vital 
gains in substantive equality in practice, its potential for redressing 
the disadvantages of disability has also been sharply constrained and 
vigorously contested. In short, the ADA‘s substantive equality 
requirements represent not so much a clear victory for disability 
rights, but instead reflect a continuing confusion and contest over 
whether equal rights or unequal charity is the best answer to 
disability‘s disadvantage.  
This substantive equality scale, like the formal equality scale it 
supplements, obscures our ability to see how substantive inequality is 
 
 43. See McCluskey, supra note 8, at 121–28. 
 44. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 956–57, 1023–26 (2003).  
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (providing ―undue hardship on the operation of the 
business‖ as a defense exempting employers from the ADA‘s reasonable accommodation 
requirement); see also id. § 12111(10) (defining ―undue hardship‖ as ―an action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense‖). 
 46. For a critical analysis of judicial reasoning portraying accommodations for less 
severely disabled employees as unjustified ―handouts,‖ see Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 470 & n.277 (2000); Matthew Diller, Judicial 
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 48 & 
n.170 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] The Biological/Social Divide, Disability, and Equality 123 
 
 
not simply a problem of inherently costly individual limitations, 
constraining differences, or external domination precluding 
individual choice. Instead, substantive inequality can be a problem of 
social and political decisions to privilege some individual constraints 
or choices while penalizing others. Critiques of the equal treatment-
special treatment dilemma explain that if a group‘s particular 
limitations, needs, or interests are recognized, supported, and valued 
as part of normally beneficial functioning, a person in that group can 
appear formally equal and substantively different at the same time.
47
 
Similarly, if a group‘s particular (biological or social) limitations, 
needs, or interests are recognized as normative baselines or natural 
aspects of human functioning, a person identified with that group can 
appear both to deserve substantive support and to be an autonomous 
rational actor enhancing overall public well-being.
48
  
Is the human need for sleep, for example, a costly limitation or 
status of dependency in need of substantive accommodation in work 
hours for those particularly unable or unwilling to take sufficient 
drugs to maintain close to twenty-four-hour wakefulness? Similarly, 
are demands for workplace toilets requests for special treatment by 
those unwilling or unable to use catheters or diapers to eliminate 
bodily waste at work?
49
 It misses the mark to ask whether workers‘ 
needs for daily sleep or for toilets count as biological or social 
constraints in need of costly accommodation, on the one hand, or 
freely chosen social ―differences,‖ on the other. Instead, a more 
meaningful question would ask about the substantive merits of 
requiring workplaces to support daily sleep and toilet use. In the 
contemporary U.S., status or conduct as a daily sleeper or as a toilet 
user is not typically perceived as disadvantageous dependence or 
difference precisely because both the social choices and the 
 
 47. McCluskey, supra note 8, at 128–29. 
 48. For an extended discussion of disability discrimination as a problem of social 
prejudice based on problematic construction of normal human functioning, see Bagenstos, 
supra note 46, at 436–50; see also McCluskey, supra note 5, at 872–73 (arguing that equality 
doctrine should be based on the idea that ―disability is normal‖). 
 49. See generally MARC LINDER & INGRID NYGAARD, VOID WHERE PROHIBITED: REST 
BREAKS AND THE RIGHT TO URINATE ON COMPANY TIME (1998) (discussing changing policies 
toward restroom breaks in the workplace). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:109 
 
 
biological constraints involved generally are deemed normal and 
beneficial despite any associated costs.  
Similarly, Laura Kessler astutely explains how the biological 
versus social construction question wrongly reduces substantive 
inequality to a question of individual constraint versus choice in 
employment discrimination cases involving workers‘ family 
caretaking.
50
 For example, a court denied the sex discrimination 
claim of a breast-feeding worker who was demoted and harassed for 
taking work breaks (with her employer‘s approval) to pump her 
breasts, reasoning that any disadvantage was the result of real and 
relevant female physiological difference, rather than gender 
stereotypes.
51
 Despite criticizing this biological determinism, Kessler 
analyzes how a shift to social constructivism also tends to legitimate 
workplace penalties for family caretakers.
52
 If caretaking women are 
seen as disadvantaged at work by culture, rather than by biology, then 
this harm appears to be the product of changeable individual 
behavior, rather than fixed gender identity.
53
 Because breast-feeding 
workers can always ―choose‖ not to breast-feed to avoid employment 
penalties, any resulting workplace detriments may be attributed to 
individual choice rather then to sex discrimination. But if we counter 
such conclusions by stressing constraints on women‘s capacity for 
meaningful choice, we risk reinforcing policies promoting control 
and exclusion more than accommodation and support.
54
 Kessler 
concludes that neither social nor biological approaches challenge the 
problematic presumption that family caretaking represents social or 
biological inferiority.
55
 She advocates grounding substantive 
accommodation not in private incapacity but instead in public 
 
 50. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, 
Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 447, 452–53 (2001).  
 51. Id. at 405–06 (discussing Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999)). The court in Martinez also denied the plaintiff‘s claim that disadvantageous treatment 
based on breast-feeding constituted disability discrimination under the ADA, reasoning that 
breast-feeding, while biological, is not a physiological disorder. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 
308–09. 
 52. See Kessler, supra note 50, at 405–07.  
 53. Id. at 443. 
 54. Id. at 448–49.  
 55. Id. at 437.  
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capacity for advancing social and moral well-being.
56
 Just as equality 
is not a question of who is ―different‖ but of whose differences are 
normally privileged, equality is not simply a question of who can 
freely choose but of whose ―choices‖ are normally privileged.  
C. Tipping The Equality Scales: Sexual Orientation  
Adding sexual orientation destabilizes both equality scales by 
foregrounding the limits of the biological/social inquiry into false 
difference or real constraint on choice. Formal protection against 
irrational attributions of ―difference‖ on the basis of status as gay or 
lesbian will seem difficult to distinguish from claims for substantive 
accommodation of difference on the basis of gay or lesbian conduct. 
Even if sexual orientation is viewed as an irrelevant immutable 
biological status subject to false attributions of difference,
57
 like race, 
sex, and disability (in the problematic mainstream view), this 
different status involves changeable social conduct by those 
challenging their subordinate status. The potentially irrelevant 
difference of sexual orientation is generally understood as socially 
invisible without some action by the individual marked as different 
(such as coming out as ―gay‖ or having a same-sex intimate 
relationship).  
This confusion of identity and action grounds arguments that laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation confer 
―special rights‖ (substantive accommodation of different functioning) 
rather than ―equal rights‖ (formal protection for sameness).58 As with 
disability or gender, this supposed ―accommodation‖ can appear 
unjustified because the ―different‖ functioning of sexual orientation 
appears to involve contested individual, cultural, and moral choices 
rather than simply biological constraint.  
 
 56. Id. at 452–53. 
 57. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994) (critiquing arguments relying on 
biological immutability as the basis for constitutional equal protection of lesbians and gay 
men). 
 58. See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights and the Nature of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 588–89 (1998); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637–38 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
can lead to special rights for ―homosexual conduct‖). 
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Focusing on sexual orientation as a window into broader problems 
with equality law, Kenji Yoshino argues for expanding the vision of 
equality to protect against imposed sameness, not just forced 
difference.
59
 Yoshino describes the heavy costs of ―covering‖ gay 
identity to show that problematic social ascription of sameness as 
well as imposed difference lies at the heart of status inequality.
60
 
Explaining a continuum of unjust constraints on the choice to be or 
act ―different,‖ Yoshino argues that meaningful equality requires 
going beyond protecting a gay man as long as he ―converts‖ to 
heterosexuality, ―passes‖ as straight (as in the military‘s don‘t ask, 
don‘t tell policy), or sufficiently ―covers‖ his identity as gay (coming 
out without ―flaunting it‖).61  
The conventional equality paradigm always confers protection for 
changeable conduct, even though on the surface it limits protection to 
essential status (whether status as ―really‖ the same under formal 
equality, or status as ―really‖ different under substantive equality). As 
Yoshino concludes, in the context of race and gender as well as 
sexual orientation, civil rights laws are fundamentally about who 
should change their attitudes and behavior (or the identity those 
actions constitute): the white supremacist or the person of color? The 
woman or the misogynist? The lesbian or the homophobe?
62
 As the 
Supreme Court infamously concluded in dismissing segregation‘s 
harm as a problem of bad attitudes on the part of those categorized as 
black in Plessy v. Ferguson, racial segregation involves both an 
imposition of formal biological status and also a social act 
interpreting this status as harmful.
63
 The Court‘s reasoning was 
 
 59. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL 
RIGHTS 74–110 (2006). 
 60. Id. at 107. 
 61. Id. at 18–19. 
 62. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 938 (2002). Critical race scholar Angela 
Harris similarly discusses how a contemporary shift from categorical racism (based on ancestral 
identity) to colorism (based on a complex hierarchy of racial appearance) might heighten racial 
stigma for those who do not or cannot avoid certain racially-coded appearances or behaviors. 
Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the New Century, 
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL‘Y 52, 64 (2008). 
 63. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (infamously reasoning that if laws 
mandating racial segregation are perceived as a badge of inferiority, that ―is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] The Biological/Social Divide, Disability, and Equality 127 
 
 
flawed not because segregation‘s harm is purely biological, but 
because the Court affirmed the wrong social interpretation of 
segregation.  
Disability discrimination‘s position at the top of the substantive 
scale highlights this question of who should change by explicitly 
identifying equality with limited accommodation. Yet that 
substantive question is inevitable to the formal antidiscrimination 
scale.
64
 Both formal and substantive equality scales limit analysis of 
the question who should change by using a simplistic division 
between a fixed biological core and contingent social response. By 
imagining an unchangeable biological core without relevant 
substance, the formal equal treatment principle makes its prohibition 
of unequal treatment appear to be free from (rational and relevant) 
substantive cost or controversy. On the other hand, by imagining a 
biological status that is unchangeable but relevant to beneficial 
substantive functioning, the substantive accommodation principle 
presents its requirement of ―different‖ treatment as generally costly 
and therefore normally sharply limited.  
As Kessler and Yoshino show, reducing inequality to biological 
constraints on individual action legitimates inequality on both formal 
and substantive scales because—on closer examination—every 
instance of protected biological constraint can logically appear to 
involve unprotected social choice.
65
 The social constructivist 
alternative is simply the other side of this problem. The formal 
equality scale justifies change to the extent harm results from 
immaterial social ideas, and the substantive equality scale justifies 
change to the extent social interpretation is immaterial to the harm. 
Equality will logically appear suspect when founded on social 
immateriality, however, because in the real world, judgments of harm 
involve social ideas about what matters and how.  
In short, the biological/social divide provides an uneasy 
justification for change that advances equality, rendering any such 
change logically suspicious, because the objective line it attempts to 
draw is too thin and slippery to provide satisfactory support for 
change. This tension is especially clear in the context of disability, 
 
 64. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 830. 
 65. See Kessler, supra note 50, at 448–49.  
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because its position at the top of the substantive equality scale most 
explicitly and directly frames the question of equality as a tradeoff 
between positive and negative substantive changes. By examining 
how the biological/social divide fosters this tension to undermine 
disability rights, we can better understand the problems of the 
broader equality paradigm. 
II. LIMITING WORKERS‘ COMPENSATION THROUGH BIOLOGICAL 
STATUS 
The legal right to workers‘ compensation benefits is not generally 
framed as a right to equality for persons with work-related 
disabilities. As Matthew Diller explains, disability law has divided 
into two prongs, with government benefits separated from equality. 
The separation has developed precisely because the disadvantages of 
disability have been framed as problems of biology separate from 
social prejudice.
66
 Workers‘ compensation tends to be construed not 
as an issue of civil rights, but as part of the social safety net providing 
substantive income assistance. In that view, workers‘ compensation 
benefits help alleviate the real and relevant socioeconomic harm 
deemed to result from changes in a physiological condition caused by 
workplace injury.
67
 However, by positioning the disadvantages of 
disability as a problem of substantive equal rights, the ADA breaks 
down the division between the ―civil‖ rights identified with equality 
and the welfare state‘s ―social‖ rights correcting substantive 
disadvantages.
68
 For that reason, examining workers‘ compensation‘s 
changing definition of disability can help shed light on the more overt 
confusion about substantive equality in the ADA.  
 
 66. Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions between the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1006 
(1998).  
 67. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and 
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
75, 98 (1993) (situating workers‘ compensation in a fragmented fabric of social welfare and tort 
protections). 
 68. See Diller, supra note 66, at 1082 (concluding that the neat division between disability 
benefits and civil rights represents outdated views of disability that the ADA aimed to change). 
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A. Compensating Medical “Impairment,” Not Work Disability 
Beginning in the late 1980s, insurers and employers mobilized a 
nationwide campaign to reform state workers‘ compensation laws.69 
One goal was to change the method of defining disability in 
compensation awards for workers sustaining permanent partial 
injuries, which make up the bulk of workers‘ compensation benefit 
costs.
70
 For many permanent injuries and illnesses, states traditionally 
determined benefit amounts through individualized estimates of 
injured workers‘ future wage loss, considering not only the nature of 
the injury but also workers‘ age, skills, education, and local labor 
market conditions.
71
 Reform advocates instead promoted medical 
impairment, separate from socioeconomic factors, as the basis for 
calculating compensation amounts.
72
 Consistent with this goal, most 
states now require or recommend use of the American Medical 
Association‘s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 
commonly known as the AMA Guides, as a key part of determining 
workers‘ compensation benefits.73  
Political efforts to increase use of the AMA Guides in workers‘ 
compensation have continued through the first decade of the twenty-
first century.
74
 Substantial changes in the AMA Guides‘ methodology 
 
 69. McCluskey, supra note 42, at 704–08. 
 70. Id. at 830–34. 
 71. Id. at 833.  
 72. Id. at 835–41. For a discussion of the questions raised by using medical status as the 
definition of disability for determining social security benefits, see Lance Liebman, The 
Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the 
Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 842–47 (1976). 
 73. AM. MED. ASS‘N, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT § 2.1(a), 
at 20 (Christopher R. Brigham & Robert D. Rondinelli eds., 6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter AMA 
GUIDES, 6th ed.] (noting forty-four states and two commonwealths requiring use of the AMA 
GUIDES); see also AMA GUIDES RES. CTR., OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES: AMA 
GUIDES HANDBOOK tbl.1 (2009), http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20090916052048 
_large.pdf (identifying thirty-one states with statutes directing use of the AMA Guides). 
 74. See Impairment Resources, National Presentations on Driving Accurate Impairment 
Ratings, May 2009, http://www.impairment.com/NationalPresentationsOnDrivingAccurate 
ImpairmentRatings.htm (reporting that the Senior Contributing Editor of the AMA Guides 
received standing ovations for featured speeches advocating the impairment ratings as a cost-
cutting measure to two leading workers‘ compensation insurance trade associations at their 
2009 annual meetings); Todd D. McFarren, AMA Guides, Sixth Edition Arrive on the Scene, 
LEXISNEXIS WORKERS‘ COMP. LAW CTR., Dec. 18, 2008, http://law.lexisnexis.com/practice 
areas/Workers-Compensation-Law-Blog/Workers-Compensation/AMA-Guides-Sixth-Edition-
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and impairment ratings have fueled ongoing controversy and 
confusion.
75
 The Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides, published in 2008 
(and supplemented with extensive corrections shortly afterward),
76
 
declares itself as a ―paradigm shift‖ from the Fifth Edition.77 As of 
2009, nine or ten states had adopted the Sixth Edition, but the Fifth 
Edition (2001) of the AMA Guides remained the most commonly 
authorized version, while a number of states continued to require use 
of the Fourth Edition (1993) or Third Edition (1988) or did not 
specify which edition to use.
78
 Some states using the AMA Guides 
have explicitly rejected the Sixth Edition due to concerns about 
benefit reductions, cost, complexity, or validity.
79
  
The AMA Guides provide standardized directions for physicians to 
quantify the degree of impairment of various specific body parts and 
organs, and to then translate these ratings into more general 
numerical ratings of larger body regions.
80
 The ratings are converted 
to a measurement of ―whole person‖ impairment for use in legal 
proceedings.
81
 For example, the Sixth Edition tells an evaluating 
 
Arrive-on-the-Scene (reporting that the updated edition of the AMA Guides accelerates a 
dangerously successful political effort to reduce workers‘ benefits, and noting that California 
reformed its workers‘ compensation laws in 2005 to adopt the AMA Guides‘ disability 
determinations). 
 75. For a summary of state controversies concerning the Sixth Edition, see Diana Ferriter, 
Bureau Chief, Workers‘ Compensation Claims Assistance, Mont. Dep‘t of Labor & Indus., 6th 
Edition of the AMA Guides to Permanent Impairment, Aug. 20, 2009, http://erd.dli.mt.gov/ 
wcstudyproject/sixth_ed_ama_guides_permanent.pdf. 
 76. See AMA Guides, 6th ed., supra note 73; Am. Med. Ass‘n, Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition, Clarifications and Corrections (2008) (providing fifty-
two pages of errata).  
 77. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.1, at 2. 
 78. See AMA GUIDES RES. CTR. STAFF, supra note 73 (counting nine states using the 
sixth edition as of July 2009); Impairment Resources, Use of the AMA Guides by State, 
http://www.impairment.com/Use_of_AMA_Guides.htm (counting ten states using the Sixth 
Edition.).  
 79. See, e.g., DWIGHT T. LOVAN, COMM‘R, KY. OFFICE OF WORKER‘S CLAIMS, 
COMMISSIONER‘S REPORT (2009), http://www.labor.Ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/DC046C16-F0FF-
4BB5-98B8-7C1CE7E92D02/0/CommissionerReportonAMAGuides.pdf (concluding that the 
state should continue to use the Fifth Edition); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 876-2.4 (2009) 
(regulation directing use of the Fifth Edition); 2009 NEV. STAT. 3030 (amending law directing 
use of the most recent edition to instead require use of the Fifth Edition, in legislation enacted 
over the governor‘s veto in 2009). 
 80. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 2.1(a), at 20, (discussing the typical use of the 
AMA Guides). 
 81. Id. 
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physician that a fracture of a particular bone in the middle finger, 
treated surgically and resulting in permanent mild deformity and 
pain, rates a six percent impairment of the finger.
82
 In the Sixth 
Edition, a six percent middle finger impairment dictates a two percent 
impairment of the hand, which in turn equals a one percent upper 
extremity impairment and then a one percent impairment rating for 
the ―whole person.‖83 The ―whole person‖ percentage rating is the 
same regardless of social and environmental factors such as what that 
―whole person‖ does for a living. A bank president and a meatcutter 
would get the same impairment rating for a fractured finger even 
though the meatcutter is likely to lose her job (and her means of 
income) due to the injury while the bank president‘s income is likely 
to be unaffected.  
The argument for relying on the AMA Guides‘ impairment ratings 
rather than general evidence of wage loss holds that the AMA Guides 
more accurately and easily sort real from illegitimate claims of 
disability.
84
 The change from wage loss to impairment determinations 
appears to ground workers‘ compensation in objective health status, 
scientifically determined by experts, with the mushy sociolegal 
factors peeled away. Estimations of future wage loss are inevitably 
subjective, contingent, and contestable, dependent on workers‘ 
behavior, on employers‘ behavior, and on broader social conditions. 
By relying on medical impairment status instead, proponents of the 
AMA Guides argue that states will reduce administrative costs and 
fraudulent claims, thereby benefiting truly disabled workers as well 
as their employers.
85
  
The AMA Guides‘ professed value depends on carefully 
differentiating its medical impairment ratings from sociolegal 
disability determinations. The AMA Guides‘ stated goal is ―to provide 
 
 82. Id. at 413 ex.15-2, 393 tbl.15-2 (giving a conversion factor from middle finger to hand 
of twenty percent).  
 83. Id. at 413 ex.15-2. 
 84. See McCluskey, supra note 42, at 838–39 & n.755 (discussing and criticizing this 
argument). For a critical discussion of similar reasoning and resulting questions about the use of 
medical status to define disability for determining social security benefits, see Liebman, supra 
note 72, at 842–47. 
 85. McCluskey, supra note 42, at 838 & n.755 (citing arguments and giving contrary 
evidence). 
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a standardized, objective approach to evaluating medical 
impairments‖86 separate from the contingent, complex social and 
economic factors that go into determining ―work disability.‖87 The 
AMA Guides draw on the social model of disability to explain that, 
unlike impairment, ―disability‖ is ―context specific, not inherent in 
the individual, but a function of the interaction of the individual and 
the environment.‖88 In bold print, the Fifth Edition explains that 
―disability‖ is an ―alteration of an individual‘s capacity to meet 
personal, social or occupational demands or statutory or regulatory 
requirements because of an impairment.‖89  
The Sixth Edition of the AMA Guides somewhat revises this 
conceptual framework by defining disability as ―activity limitations 
and/or participation restrictions in an individual with a health 
condition, disorder, or disease.‖90 This definition partially retreats 
from the previous overt placement of ―impairment‖ as the 
determining cause of broader socioeconomic limitations.
91
 The Sixth 
Edition recognizes that the relationships between bodily functions 
and activities or participations are not ―linear or unidirectional.‖92 Yet 
the AMA Guides continues to reinforce and privilege the idea of a 
core objective biological status measurable apart from these 
subjective and tangential social actions (activities and participation). 
The Sixth Edition explains that its impairment ratings enable 
physicians to give a ―quantitative estimate of losses to the individual 
as a result of their health condition, disorder, or disease.‖93 It 
distinguishes this medically measured loss from assessments of ―the 
full array of human functional activities and participations that are 
required for comprehensive disability determinations.‖94  
 
 86. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.2(a), at 20; AM. MED. ASS‘N, GUIDES TO 
THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 1 (Linda Cocchiarella & Gunnar B.J. 
Andersson eds., 5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter AMA GUIDES, 5th ed.].  
 87. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 4–5; see also id. § 1.2b, at 8–9 
(distinguishing work disability from impairment); AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.3d, 
at 5 (distinguishing impairment, based on medical expertise, from disability determinations). 
 88. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2b, at 8.  
 89. Id.  
 90. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.3d, at 5. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
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The AMA Guides explains that impairment refers to ―functional 
limitations,‖95 or more precisely, the decrease in an individual‘s 
overall ability to perform activities of daily living.
96
 But what 
distinguishes this functional incapacity for activities that counts as 
the scientifically measurable health status, from the contextual 
functional incapacity identified as disability? 
The AMA Guides defines impairment as ―a loss, loss of use, or 
derangement of any body part, organ system or organ function.‖97 A 
―loss, loss of use, or derangement‖ is further defined as ―a change 
from a normal or ‗preexisting‘ state.‖
98
 But how do the AMA Guides 
decide what functioning counts as ―normal‖? It determines the ―range 
or zone representing healthy functioning,‖ a status which the AMA 
Guides explains ―varies with age, gender, and other factors such as 
environmental conditions.‖
99
 In this circular reasoning, the AMA 
Guides distinguishes the inherent biological condition from 
contextual social functioning by measuring that biological condition 
in light of expectations about the individual‘s ability to function in 
particular social contexts. Health status does not neatly precede 
functional ability; instead, functional ability determines and precedes 
status.
100
  
 
 95. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 4. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. § 1.2a, at 2. The Sixth Edition inserts the word ―significant‖ before ―loss.‖ AMA 
GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.3d, at 5.  
 98. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 2; see also AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., 
supra note 73, § 1.3a, at 3 (also defining impairment as physiological functions and body parts 
that ―can vary from the normal state, in terms of loss or deviations‖).  
 99. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2a, at 2; see also AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., 
supra note 73, at 612.  
 100. The diagram introducing the Fifth Edition fudges this contradiction, drawing 
―impairment‖ distinct from and presumably placed prior to functional limitation, with one-way 
arrows pointing from impairment and functional limitation to disability, but then also 
suggesting possible reverse causation by adding another set of arrows running both ways 
between impairment and functional limitation. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 1.2b, at 
8. The Sixth Edition explicitly rejects the traditional unidirectional scheme moving from 
pathology to impairment to disability. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 4 fig.1.2. 
Instead, it offers a more complex diagram, with two-way arrows connecting body functions and 
structures (on the left) to activities (in the center) and then to participation (on the right), along 
with two-way arrows linking all of these to underlying categories of ―environmental‖ and 
―personal‖ factors. Id. However, this diagram links this entire scheme (with two-way arrows) to 
an overarching category at the top marked ―Health condition, Disorder or Disease,‖ which 
suggests that medical status remains at the core and also the dominant factor. Id. § 1.3, at 3.  
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The AMA Guides is therefore problematic for determining 
disability benefits not simply because it excludes some 
socioeconomic factors relevant to measuring income loss. More 
fundamentally, medical impairment ratings fail to measure 
physiological health status separate from disability. In her historical 
analysis of the ideology and politics of disability, Deborah Stone 
concludes that the distinction between impairment and disability is 
―liturgical cant‖: it gets its validity from repetition and faith, not 
empirical evidence or logic.
101
 The concept of impairment inevitably 
incorporates and depends on social judgment, as legal scholar Ellen 
Smith Pryor wrote in reviewing the AMA Guides‘ Third Edition.102 
Just as the formalistic determination of ―difference‖ in equality law 
requires an assumption of a substantive norm for differentiating, the 
formalistic determination of impaired function in laws governing 
substantive benefits requires an assumption of a substantive norm for 
determining functioning. With disability, as with race and sex, the 
biological or scientific core status has meaning only in relation to 
functioning in a particular social, economic, and political context. 
Indeed, the concept of ―medical impairment‖ seems primarily useful 
as a strategy for removing contested judgments about disability from 
political, social, and legal scrutiny.  
The AMA Guides‘ ratings perform a sleight of hand, offering 
―impairment‖ as a fixed medical status, more objectively measurable 
than contingent social functioning. But then the AMA Guides 
switches to contingent functional impact as the more objectively 
measurable medical fact necessary to reveal an ever-elusive 
underlying biological status. The AMA Guides makes continual 
normative decisions about which functions to measure as deviations 
from ―normal‖ bodily function according to which standards, and 
under which conditions.  
Even at the micro level of individual anatomical parts or organs, 
the AMA Guides cannot escape tricky and contested value judgments 
 
 101. DEBORAH STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 107–08 (1984). Similarly, disability studies 
scholar Simi Linton calls for a deconstruction of impairment to match the deconstruction of 
disability. SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 138 (1998). 
 102. Ellen Smith Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American Medical 
Association’s Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 964, 968 
(1990) (book review). 
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about what counts as normal bodily functioning. Pryor‘s critique of 
the AMA Guides compared how the Third Edition ignored loss of 
sensation in rating female genital functioning but counted loss of 
sensation in rating male genital functioning.
103
 Beyond such 
obviously discreditable bias, even generally accepted social norms 
are little help in resolving many contestable judgments of normal 
physiological functioning. For example, in measuring the degree of 
impairment from a given level of muscle weakness in a hand, should 
it matter whether you are measuring the person‘s dominant hand? 
The AMA Guides Fifth Edition concludes it does not.
104
  
Similarly, should age and individual interest matter in determining 
deviation from normal function of a body part? When measuring 
hearing loss, the AMA Guides determines it does not; impairment 
ratings are not lowered for old age
105
 or raised for bird watchers,
106
 
but instead are based on a standardized assumption of capacity to 
hear ―everyday sounds.‖107 Nonetheless, when it comes to penile 
injuries, the AMA Guides gives physicians the discretion to consider 
both age and individual activities, allowing extra impairment points 
for men under forty deemed to have active sexual functioning prior to 
the injury, while advising downward adjustment of impairment 
 
 103. Id. at 969–70. In an audio interview with senior contributing editor Christopher R. 
Brigham, an attorney asked why the Sixth Edition rates male loss of sexual function as a fifteen 
percent whole person impairment but loss of female sexual function as twenty percent, to which 
the senior editor responded ―I have no explanation for that‖ and admitted the ratings were ―far 
from perfect.‖ Interview with Dr. Christopher Brigham, Senior Contributing Editor, AMA 
GUIDES (Apr. 28, 2008), http://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-matters/2008/04/ 
workers-comp-the-ama-guides-6th-edition/; see also AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 
141–49, 151–52 (giving fifteen percent as the maximum whole-person rating for male 
reproductive disease and giving twenty percent as the maximum whole-person rating for female 
reproductive disease). 
 104. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 16.1, at 435 (noting hand dominance is 
relevant to assessing disability rather than impairment).  
 105. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 11.2c, at 249 (instructing assignment of rating 
regardless of age or noise exposure); see also id. § 11.2d, at 250 (disregarding individual 
hobbies or occupations). 
 106. Id. § 11.2d, at 250 (disregarding individual hobbies or occupations). 
 107. Id. § 11.2c, at 249 (instructing assignment of rating regardless of age or noise 
exposure); id. § 11.2d, at 250 (disregarding individual hobbies or occupations); id. § 11.2e, at 
251 (explaining ―everyday‖ sounds and conditions as basis for the standards).  
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ratings for penile injuries in men over sixty-five or for men perceived 
as having histories of lower levels of sexual functioning.
108
  
How should impairment ratings count medical treatment affecting 
the functioning of a given bodily part, organ, or system? The AMA 
Guides measures hearing loss without considering the mitigating 
functional impact of corrective devices (hearing aids),
109
 reflecting 
the theory that impairment is an underlying physiological state 
extracted from corrective behavior. Nonetheless, the Sixth Edition‘s 
rating system recognizes that medical treatment can be the main 
burden on normal functioning for endocrine conditions such as 
diabetes.
110
 Furthermore, the Sixth Edition changes previous editions‘ 
assumption that surgical treatment is evidence of severity of 
musculoskeletal impairment, instead decreeing that surgical treatment 
is evidence of improved functioning.
111
 A medical expert on Iowa‘s 
task force studying the Sixth Edition explained how this approach 
produces illogical results.
112
 For workers appropriately diagnosed and 
surgically treated for carpal tunnel syndrome, the AMA Guides would 
direct the physician to reject the previously correct diagnosis of 
carpal tunnel once surgery is complete, and to instead attribute any 
continuing symptoms to a much lower rated diagnosis of 
―nonspecific wrist pain.‖113  
A further normative issue involves the AMA Guides‘ choice 
among various methods of measuring degree of functional loss. In 
prior editions, musculoskeletal ratings (which constitute almost 
ninety percent of impairment ratings)
114
 focused on the individual‘s 
range of motion and strength. For example, the Fifth Edition 
instructed physicians to test the grip and pinch strength of an 
 
 108. Id. § 7.7, at 143.  
 109. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 11.1a, at 246; AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra 
note 73, § 11.1, at 248. 
 110. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.8, at 16.  
 111. Interview with Dr. Christopher Brigham, supra note 103. 
 112. John Kuhnlein, Iowa Div. of Worker‘s Comp., Member Report for the Iowa Task 
Force Regarding the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition, 
2008 Iowa AMA Guides Task Force Process Report 6–7 (2008).  
 113. Id.  
 114. Videotape: AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition: 
New Concepts, Challenges and Opportunities (Christopher R. Brigham ed., 2008), available at 
http://www.impairment.com/6/orientation-flash.htm. 
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individual‘s hand at repeated intervals during an examination with 
the injured person sitting in various specified positions.
115
 In contrast, 
the Sixth Edition determines musculoskeletal ratings primarily 
through a formal grid of diagnostic classifications, such as whether 
the hand injury is located in the muscle, ligament, or bone, with only 
minor adjustments for physical examination, clinical measurements, 
or functional history.
116
 By emphasizing fixed classifications over 
functional clinical measurements, the Sixth Edition presumably aims 
to reduce variations in measurement due to contextual factors such as 
effort of the injured person, physician skill, and the testing 
environment.  
But, while it seems logical to rate decreasing measurements of 
grip strength along an increasing scale of impairment severity, the 
basis for numerically ranking various formal diagnostic categories 
appears less clear, or at least less clearly grounded in medicine rather 
than socioeconomic interests.
117
 For example, the Sixth Edition gives 
a cervical fusion injury a zero to six percent whole person 
impairment rating based on its new ranking scheme, while a similar 
injury could produce a twenty-five percent whole person rating under 
the Fifth Edition.
118
 Similarly, in one example of compressive penile 
injury used in both editions, the Sixth Edition downgrades the organ 
level impairment rating to three percent (compared to five percent in 
the Fifth Edition) because the Sixth Edition assigns a lower rank to 
losses classified as involving sensation than to losses classified as 
involving ‖insufficient erection.‖119 The connection between the AMA 
Guides‘ ratings of relative functional loss and medical expertise is 
especially tenuous when the diagnostic criteria for impairment rating 
do not track medical criteria used for treatment, as in the carpal 
 
 115. AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, § 16.8, at 508.  
 116. See AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 15.2, at 387 (discussing this new 
diagnostic-based impairment approach for upper extremities). 
 117. For example, one medical expert noted concern that previous editions decided not to 
use percentage numbers for rating mental disorders because those numbers ―may not translate 
very well into reality‖ and that by assigning numerical percentages, the Sixth Edition ―implies a 
certainty that doesn‘t exist.‖ Letter from James Gallagher, Diplomate, Am Bd. of Psychiatry & 
Neurology, to Peter Thrill, Att‘y, Betty, Neuman & McMahon, P.L.C. (July 10, 2008); 
available at http://www.iowataskforce.org/wc/amataskforce/jamesgallagher.pdf.  
 118. KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 3.  
 119. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 143, ex.7-25; 144 tbl.7-6. 
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tunnel example discussed above. One member of Iowa‘s task force 
on the AMA Guides‘ revisions reported that the Sixth Edition 
involves ―little, if any, attempt to actually ‗measure‘ anything,‖ and 
that the AMA Guides would be just as valid and far simpler if one 
random numerical rating were assigned to all classes of 
impairment.
120
  
Indeed, the AMA Guides derives its numerical impairment ratings 
not from any testable empirical or clinical evidence or medical 
expertise, but from a ―consensus‖ of socioeconomic intuitions from 
the AMA Guides‘ contributors.121 In a 2001 ruling under the federal 
Longshore and Harbor Workers‘ Compensation Act, an 
administrative law judge decided that the AMA Guides‘ ratings failed 
to satisfy the Daubert
122
 standard for admissibility of scientific 
evidence, citing testimony from the Fifth Edition‘s lead author for the 
upper extremities chapter, who agreed that when it comes to rating a 
finger impairment as a certain percent of the body as a whole, ―there 
isn‘t any science about it.‖123  
The ―consensus‖ that grounds the ratings has not included legal 
experts or representatives of workers‘ interests, nor has it represented 
a broad or scientific sample of medical expertise.
124
 In its analysis of 
the Sixth Edition, Iowa‘s task force asked the AMA to clarify the 
composition of the consensus group for each chapter, but the AMA 
declined to provide this information.
125
 Instead, the AMA provided 
only the general list of fifty-three chapter contributors in the AMA 
 
 120. MATTHEW DAKE, IOWA DIV. OF WORKER‘S COMP., AMA GUIDES TASK FORCE-
REPORT OF MEMBER MATTHEW DAKE 8–9, http://www.iowaworkforce.org/wc/amataskforce/ 
dakereport.pdf.  
 121. See AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, § 1.3d, at 5 (defining impairment rating as a 
―consensus-derived percentage estimate of the loss of activity reflecting severity for a given 
health condition‖). A diverse group of independent experts (not directly linked to the insurance 
industry) criticized the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides for lacking validity, internal 
consistency, reliability, comprehensiveness, and accessibility. See Emily A. Spieler et al., 
Recommendations to Guide Revision of the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 
283 JAMA 519, 519–23 (2000). 
 122. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 123. Hodgkinson v. Elec. Boat Corp., 35 Ben. Rev. Bd. Serv. (MB) 459 (May 18, 2001) 
(discussing testimony of Dr. Frank Jones). 
 124. DAKE, supra note 120, at 2–3 (discussing flawed process of producing ―consensus‖ 
without consultation with legal experts). 
 125. KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 9.  
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Guides‘ preface without any identification of individual chapter 
authorship or level of involvement.
126
 Upon questioning by the task 
force, the AMA Guides‘ senior medical editor explained that the 
consensus group for each chapter was drawn from those with national 
membership in the relevant medical specialty who also ―were 
interested enough in the development of an impairment rating process 
to volunteer their time and efforts.‖127 He also explained that the 
editorial panel was chosen to agree with the lead editors‘ proposed 
paradigm shift.
128
 Further undercutting the asserted ―consensus,‖ one 
state‘s workers‘ compensation medical director withdrew from 
participation in the Sixth Edition because of disagreement with lead 
editors over content and methodology.
129
 Another physician on the 
AMA Guides‘ advisory committee, who was a past president of the 
American Academy of Disability Evaluating Physicians, expressed 
concerns to Iowa‘s task force about ―hidden agendas and biased 
allegiances‖ in the process of developing the Sixth Edition.130 
What contested legal and political judgments hide under these 
dubious claims to scientific consensus? In rating ―whole person‖ 
impairment, the AMA Guides purports to measure capacity to perform 
the ―activities of daily living,‖ but distinguishes the allegedly 
scientific ―impairment‖ measure from subjective ―disability‖ by 
considering the loss of ability to perform activities other than work.
131
 
In short, ―impairment ratings‖ are largely ratings of non-work 
disability that then become presented as an ―objective‖ basis for 
evaluating work disability. In effect, the impairment ratings assume a 
standard of ―normal functioning‖ based on a person who does not 
normally include wage work among their daily activities—or a 
 
 126. Id. For the list of chapter contributors, see AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 
vii–viii. 
 127. HELENJEAN M. WALLESER, DEPUTY COMM‘R, IOWA DIV. OF WORKERS COMP., 2008 
AMA GUIDES TASK FORCE PROCESS REPORT 4 (2008), http://www.iowaworkforce.org/wc/ 
amataskforce/2008amaguidesprocessreport.pdf (reporting the response of Robert D. Rondinelli, 
M.D.). 
 128. DAKE, supra note 120, at 3.  
 129. KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 11 (noting the withdrawal of Dr. Alan Colledge as 
ground for concern about the ―consensus‖). 
 130. Id. at 9 (reporting comments of Douglas Martin, M.D., as evidence of problems with 
the AMA Guides‘ ―consensus‖ ratings). 
 131. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, §§ 1.3d & 1.3e, at 5–6.  
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normal person for whom work activities make no significant bodily 
demands beyond those encountered in nonwork activities.  
Proponents of the AMA Guides have long deflected such criticism 
by insisting that the AMA Guides should be used only for measuring 
medical conditions, not for directly estimating the sociolegal 
condition of work disability. But despite previous editions‘ 
warnings—in bold print—against sociolegal use,132 the AMA Guides 
have no medical use.
133
 Instead, the AMA Guides‘ only real purpose 
is the sociolegal determination of disability, particularly work 
disability. The AMA created the AMA Guides in 1958 as a sociolegal 
strategy aimed at making private doctors, rather than government 
staff physicians, the source of expertise in social security disability 
hearings.
134
 Indeed, the Sixth Edition departs from previous editions 
by removing the bold print warning and adding a section 
acknowledging and affirming the AMA Guides‘ sociolegal function 
for determining workers‘ compensation benefits.135 Nonetheless, this 
edition retains traditional disclaimers against such use, insisting that 
its ratings are only a ―first step‖136 that should be supplemented with 
socioeconomic factors.
137
  
With the promulgation of the Sixth Edition, the AMA Guides has 
become a highly commercialized private business, and its links to the 
AMA appear superficial or at least obscure.
138
 The Sixth Edition‘s 
senior contributing editor, Christopher R. Brigham, is the chairman of 
 
 132. See, e.g., AMA GUIDES, 5th ed., supra note 86, at 13.  
 133. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 20 (stating that ―this book is not likely to be 
used in the practice of therapeutic medicine‖); DAKE, supra note 120, at 2 (―Failing to 
acknowledge that the Guides are used exclusively for litigation purposes, represents a 
fundamental intellectual dishonesty.‖). 
 134. STONE, supra note 101, at 111–12. 
 135. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 20 (stating that ―the primary purpose of the 
Guides is to rate impairment to assist adjudicators and others in determining the financial 
compensation to be awarded to individuals who, as a result of injury or illness, have suffered 
measurable physical and/or psychological loss‖). See LOVAN, supra note 79 (noting the Sixth 
Edition changes position on the AMA Guides’ use). 
 136. AMA GUIDES, 6th ed., supra note 73, at 20. 
 137. See id. at 6 (stating that ―The Guides is not intended to be used for direct estimates of 
work participation restrictions‖ and that impairment rating ―must be further integrated with 
contextual information‖).  
 138. See DAKE, supra note 120, at 2–3 (noting that AMA Guides’ editors and authors 
speaking to Iowa‘s task force studying the Sixth Edition ―always made certain to specify they 
were not speaking for the AMA‖). 
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a company focused on the AMA Guides: Impairment Resources, 
LLC.
139
 His business charges high prices for copies of the AMA 
Guides and also for a product line of interpretive materials and 
trainings likely to be necessary for meaningful use of the Sixth 
Edition‘s dauntingly complex and error-prone rating system.140 
Although the AMA Guides are incorporated as public law in most 
states, the cost of these interpretive materials lies well outside the 
reach of most unrepresented injured workers and most legal 
professionals, scholars, and physicians who do not specialize in 
workers‘ compensation.141  
Further, Brigham‘s Impairment Resources company combines its 
economic interest in producing and interpreting the AMA Guides with 
an overriding business and political interest in reducing workers‘ 
compensation benefit costs for insurers and employers.
142
 The 
company‘s self-description states:  
Impairment Resources, LLC (formerly Brigham & Associates) 
provides you with unique, proven strategies that drive accurate 
impairment ratings and result in a superb return on investment. 
Statistics demonstrate that most impairment ratings are 
erroneously inflated and cost insurers and employers nationally 
billions of dollars. Before the development of the suite of 
services offered by Impairment Resources, LLC, adjusters, 
 
 139. Impairment Resources, Profiles, http://www.impairment.com/profiles.htm (last visited 
July 10, 2010). 
 140. Impairment Resources, Products, http://www.impairment.com/products.htm (last 
visited July 10, 2010).  
 141. See KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 8 (reporting that physicians should expect to spend 
twenty-five to thirty hours of self-study and eight hours of training to learn the Sixth Edition, 
and that tracking the errata alone took one doctor 3.5 hours); Marlon D. Mormann, IOWA DIV. 
OF WORKER‘S COMP., THE AMA GUIDES SIXTH EDITION TASK FORCE MEMBER REPORT 
(2008) (discussing the costly impact of the Sixth Edition‘s complexity on physicians, claimants, 
attorneys, and administrators); LOVAN, supra note 79 , at 6–7 (reporting testimony from 
medical experts that fewer physicians would be willing to perform impairment ratings under the 
Sixth Edition due to its increased complexity).  
 142. See KUHNLEIN, supra note 112, at 11–12 (noting that Dr. Brigham denied his defense-
side business orientation in discussions with the Iowa task force but that these ties are clearly 
evident from his publications and from his company‘s web site); see, e.g., DVD: Christopher R. 
Brigham et al., Symptom Magnification, Deception, and Malingering: Identification through 
Distraction, Tests and Other Techniques (SEAK, Inc. 2000) (focusing on methods for 
challenging workers‘ injury claims).  
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physicians and attorneys had limited tools available to cost 
effectively analyze and resolve such inaccuracies.
143
  
Aside from the AMA Guides‘ socioeconomic purposes, an 
important effect of its slippery construction of objective 
―impairment‖ distinct from subjective disability is to undermine the 
political and legal legitimacy of many individual claims for 
permanent work disability. By presenting a highly technical and 
seemingly scientific numerical rating of biological status, the AMA 
Guides‘ ratings serve to skew disability determinations even if those 
determinations supplement the ratings with socioeconomic evidence. 
The thing most understandable about ―impairment‖ is that it is 
supposed to be ―more objective‖ than claims of work disability. The 
AMA Guides‘ impairment ratings mainly function to prove that work 
disability is a suspect status produced by subjective attitudes and 
behavior that must be sharply limited and only grudgingly rewarded. 
B. Discovering Impairment and Covering Disability  
This shift to impairment status in workers‘ compensation echoes 
the ―covering‖ requirement that Yoshino describes in the context of 
sexual orientation. Consider the example of Gary Brummett, a 
construction worker without a high school diploma, who suffered a 
permanent back injury on the job in Kentucky, after that state adopted 
an impairment rating system in the 1990s.
144
 Before his injury, he 
earned $35,000 a year and owned a three bedroom home.
145
 Under 
the prior wage-loss system, his employer would have been 
responsible for assuming or mitigating the risk that Brummett‘s back 
injury would be more costly than a similar injury for someone not 
dependent on back strength for his or her income. Under that 
previous system, Brummett could have received a $73,000 lump sum 
award, giving him a chance at moving to another middle-class career 
 
 143. Impairment Resources, About Us, http://www.impairment.com/about_us.htm (last 
visited July 10, 2010).  
 144. James N. Ellenberger, The Battle over Workers’ Compensation, in 10 NEW 
SOLUTIONS: A JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 217, 217–
36 (2000) (discussing and criticizing the change from wage loss to impairment ratings for 
determining permanent partial benefits).  
 145. Id. at 217. 
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(e.g., by funding advanced education or the development of a small 
business).
146
 Instead, Brummett received only $7,400, because the 
AMA Guides ranked his medical impairment as minimal, despite his 
severe socioeconomic loss.
147
 This system forces injured workers like 
Brummett to bear the high injury costs that might have been avoided 
had they chosen a different career, in a different location, with a 
different level of education. With this low award, Brummett‘s 
employer not only does not have to compensate the actual wage loss, 
but also has reduced incentives to mitigate such losses (for example 
by improving safety or by providing workplace accommodations that 
would allow reemployment after injury).  
Like the gay man required to cover for the mutable, cultural 
aspects of his identity—to bear the costs of acting straight—the 
injured worker is required to cover for the mutable, cultural aspects 
of his or her identity, despite the cost. In this case, Brummett 
mitigated or ―accommodated‖ his wage loss by ruining his credit, 
losing his house, and subsisting on a minimum wage job delivering 
pizza. In short, workers like Brummett deserve protection for their 
incapacitated status, but that status is reduced to a fixed core 
impairment, requiring them to cover for supposedly peripheral 
behavioral contingencies and choices.  
In the case of disability, ―covering‖ paradoxically ends up serving 
to ―uncover‖ at the same time, tightening the double bind of 
substantive equality. For the injured worker, the requirement of 
covering—mitigating non-essential constraints—ironically works to 
reinforce the covered person‘s status as different and incapable of 
rational choice. The mitigation that most seriously injured workers in 
manual jobs are able to achieve without more economic support 
involves taking low-paying work, giving up financial security, 
depending on non-work income from relatives and taxpayers, or all 
of the above. This ―covering‖ requirement then means many workers 
with serious, permanent disabilities from work must accept the loss 
of their status as middle-class workers, or even as financially 
independent workers. That result, of course, is precisely the 
longstanding status problem that the workers‘ compensation and 
 
 146. Id. at 218.  
 147. See id. 
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disability rights movements arguably aimed to correct. Those 
movements challenged the view that disability normally and naturally 
leads to socioeconomic subordination, and instead argued that law 
reforms could create the conditions for greater social and economic 
capacity.
148
  
III. LIMITING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION THROUGH SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION  
As many scholars have analyzed extensively, judicial narrowing 
of the definition of ―disability‖ has stymied the ADA‘s push toward 
substantive equality.
149
 In particular, critics focused on four Supreme 
Court cases that tightened the threshold requirement of who counts as 
a person with a disability protected under the ADA.
150
 Responding to 
efforts to restore that substantive promise, Congress redefined 
―disability‖ in the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (―ADAAA‖), 
which took effect at the beginning of 2009.
151
 The ADAAA directly 
rejects the Court‘s social constructivist narrowing of disability, but 
also takes steps to resist a medical impairment model of disability. In 
doing so, the ADAAA suggests some avenues for moving beyond the 
biological/social divide toward a more meaningful substantive vision 
of disability and equality.  
 
 148. For a theory of law focused on enhancing human capacity, see MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006). 
 149. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 247–57 (2001) (finding evidence that outcomes for plaintiffs under 
the ADA are worse than outcomes for plaintiffs under other civil rights statutes); Diller, supra 
note 46, at 47–48; Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do about It?, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 100 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of 
Disability under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 321, 370–74 
(2000) (criticizing the 1999 Supreme Court rulings restricting the definition of disability); 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword: Backlash against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives 
and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7–8 (2000) 
(summarizing scholarship criticizing the narrow judicial interpretation of the ADA).  
 150. See Albertson‘s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) Toyota 
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 686 (2002).  
 151. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. 
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A. Protecting Social Functioning, Not Impairment Status  
Relying on the impairment versus disability distinction, the 
original and amended versions of the ADA define disability as a 
―physical impairment that substantially limits one or more . . . major 
life activities,‖ ―a record‖ of such an impairment, or as ―being 
regarded as having‖ such an impairment.152 This definition suggests 
the core physiological condition as the primary cause of disadvantage 
(whether real or perceived), with the incapacity for social functioning 
as a contingent effect.  
In three cases decided in 1999, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
were not persons with disabilities protected by the ADA because they 
were able to take adaptive steps to mitigate the limiting effects of 
their physical conditions.
153
 By denying that the plaintiffs‘ physical 
limitations satisfied the threshold requirement of a ―disability,‖ the 
Court did not reach the substantive questions of whether the 
detrimental employment action was due to unlawful disability 
discrimination or instead to the plaintiffs‘ failure to satisfy legitimate 
job qualifications with or without reasonable accommodations. In 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, for example, the Court denied disability 
status to two airline pilots who had visual impairments correctable by 
eyeglasses;
154
 in Murphy v. United Parcel Service, the Court denied 
disability status to a mechanic with high blood pressure controlled by 
medication;
155
 and in Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Court 
denied disability status to a truck driver with monocular vision who 
could make subconscious cognitive adjustments to compensate for 
his visual condition.
156
 In Sutton, Justice O‘Connor explained it 
would be too hypothetical and speculative to determine disability 
based on medical status alone, without looking at the workers‘ actual 
behavior and social context,
157
 even though the real problem in the 
case was that the employer did exactly that in deciding the pilots 
were unqualified for the job.  
 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. 2009). 
 153. Albertson’s, Inc., 527 U.S. 555; Murphy, 527 U.S. 516; Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.  
 154. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
 155. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518.  
 156. Albertsons, Inc., 527 U.S. at 558–59, 565–66. 
 157. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. 
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In contrast to workers‘ compensation, the Court looked for real 
disability by focusing on contingent social functioning instead of 
underlying physical status. Ironically, these ADA decisions use social 
constructivism to reinforce rather than to resist the medical model‘s 
idea that the ―real‖ harm triggering protection against inequality 
comes from an essential individual biological impairment, real or 
perceived. The Court seems to assume that once an employee‘s 
contingent actions have mitigated the (real or perceived) functional 
impact of the core biological harm, no harm remains for protection 
from discrimination.  
In Sutton, that understanding of social overlay on a biological core 
explained the Court‘s medicalized approach to defining disability 
under the alternative ―regarded as‖ prong of the ADA‘s threshold 
requirement for establishing protected status as disabled. 
Commentators had long assumed the ―regarded as‖ option was 
designed precisely for the problem raised by these cases—that 
discrimination may include stereotypical social perceptions of 
disability status not based on the person‘s specific functional 
abilities.
158
 Nonetheless, Sutton held that the airline pilots with 
correctable impaired vision failed that alternative test for disability.
159
 
The vision-impaired pilots were not ―regarded as‖ having 
impairments that substantially limited major life activities because 
there was no evidence that the employer perceived their impaired 
vision limited them from doing anything more than the particular job 
at issue.
160
 The Court assumed that there was not even any perceived 
harm left to protect when an employer‘s contingent perceptions of the 
worker‘s biological status do not proceed to attribute sufficiently 
substantial and broad functional harm to that biological condition.
161
 
In these cases, the Court uses the division between social function 
and biological essence to erode formal equal treatment protection as 
well as substantive equality. The Court‘s analysis reveals how that 
division undermines the two equality scales it appears to support. 
 
 158. See Feldblum, supra note 149, at 157-59.  
 159. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488–89.  
 160. Id. at 489–93. 
 161. See Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992 (2008) (using linguistic analysis to explain and critique 
Sutton‘s interpretation of the ―regarded as‖ prong).  
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This framework creates a bind in which the more a person 
successfully acts to satisfy functional requirements for a job despite a 
potentially disabling physiological condition, the less protection they 
have against harmful treatment based solely on prejudiced views 
about the functional impact of their biological condition. Because the 
Court reduces disability‘s essence to real or perceived individual 
functional limitations, it deems irrelevant any unequal treatment 
directed at socially imposed disability status rather than on individual 
functional limits (whether biological or social).As Jill Anderson 
argues, that misguided logic could lead to the result that the law fails 
to protect what might appear to be the penultimate instance of 
disability discrimination: an employer who simply refuses to hire 
anyone identified as disabled, regardless of specific function or 
condition, real or perceived.
162
  
In the 2002 case of Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, the Court further narrowed the threshold definition of 
protected disability status.
163
 Toyota extended the individual 
contingencies that cancel disability status to include not just adaptive 
equipment, medical treatment, or enhanced functional abilities, but 
also the ―choice‖ of an occupation requiring work-specific functional 
capacity. In Toyota, the Court again ruled that medical status was not 
a sufficient basis for disability because of the potential for individuals 
to eliminate the difference or limitation constituting that status by 
compensating for their medical conditions.
164
 The Court decided that 
an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome was not 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA, even if her medical 
condition actually limited her physical ability to do her job.
165
 The 
Court established that an inability to perform manual tasks associated 
with a specific job not common to most people, as opposed to 
ordinary personal or household tasks, is not a substantial limit on a 
major life activity.
166
 Again writing for the Court, Justice O‘Connor 
reasoned that the manual tasks of an assembly line job are not of 
 
 162. See id. at 1061–63 (explaining the intent of the ADA to cover discrimination per se or 
discrimination by proxy). 
 163. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at 187–88.  
 166. Id. at 200–02.  
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central importance to most people‘s daily lives, unlike bathing, 
eating, or brushing one‘s teeth.167 The implicit logic of the decision is 
that the injured worker in the case had the obligation to mitigate the 
functional limitations of her medical condition by withdrawing from 
her assembly line job and sticking to the limited gardening and 
housework she could still perform.
168
  
With this decision, the Court‘s social constructivist reasoning 
comes full circle to tighten the bind against substantive equality as 
well as narrowing formal equality. Strong evidence that a 
physiological condition really does substantively constrain a person‘s 
functional capacity at work does not help to establish that she is 
potentially deserving of substantive accommodation, or even that she 
has a real disability deserving of at least minimal formal protection 
against bare prejudice. The Court assumed that the fact of real 
functional disadvantage demonstrates that the problem is the injured 
person‘s attempted functioning (i.e., trying to retain her assembly line 
job) rather than her physiological status. Although this logic could be 
extended to completely eviscerate employment discrimination 
protections—one can never be essentially disabled for purposes of 
employment, because work is always a contingent behavior—the 
Court does allow broad non-work functional incapacity to constitute 
proof of disability status worthy of workplace protection. If the 
central harm of inequality is assumed to be real or imagined relevant 
individual biological failure, both formal and substantive equality 
will always seem suspect to the degree the individual‘s functioning is 
mediated through his or her contingent social action outside the 
context of disability.
169
  
B. Discovering Conduct, Covering Impairment Status 
For disability, as with sexual orientation, the threshold step of 
formal recognition of protected status blurs into substantive 
 
 167. Id. at 201–02. 
 168. See id. at 202 (noting that evidence suggested that after her condition worsened the 
plaintiff could still ―tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the 
house‖).  
 169. See YOSHINO, supra note 59 and accompanying text; Kessler, supra note 50 and 
accompanying text.  
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judgments about the merits of affirmatively accommodating that 
status. Formal recognition of identity itself will seem like undeserved 
affirmative special accommodation for particularly problematic 
behavior or ideas if we start from a presumption that an identity 
category (such as sexual orientation or disability) is a sign of failed 
individual functioning that can be legitimately penalized or pitied. 
That is, if the disadvantages of disability are presumed to largely 
result from relevant individual failures rather than social prejudice or 
structural injustice, then the protected status as disabled will tend to 
seem more suspect than employers‘ harmful treatment.  
As with the paradigm of forced heterosexual assimilation that 
Yoshino criticizes, the Court‘s social constructionist approach to 
disability assumes the disadvantaged individual should be expected to 
―cover‖ for her or his real or perceived loss of functioning. In Toyota, 
the Court‘s doubts about the reasonableness of the plaintiff‘s 
disability claim may have reflected its deeper doubts about the 
reasonableness of her decision to seek accommodations for her work-
related disability when she could instead ―cover‖ that functional loss 
by quietly withdrawing to the more ―normal‖ work of tending to her 
garden and kitchen.
170
 Applying Yoshino‘s schema of forced 
assimilation in sexual orientation law,
171
 the Court‘s reasoning seems 
consistent with a problematic judgment that if medical treatment and 
enlightened attitude cannot ―convert‖ an assembly line worker with 
carpal tunnel injuries to pain-free hand movement, then at least she 
should not ―flaunt‖ her condition by demanding that her employer 
affirmatively recognize and respond to her disability as normal and 
deserving of structural change.  
For both the ADA and workers‘ compensation, this implicit 
―covering‖ requirement reflects an assimilationist judgment that 
workers deserve protection against the disadvantages of disability 
only to the extent workers comport with workplace norms that 
normally and naturally disadvantage persons with disabilities. By 
making elusive ―real‖ biological constraint the basis for both 
threshold formal status and for substantive protection, the Court‘s 
 
 170. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 171. See YOSHINO, supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
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social constructivist approach to the ADA does the same work as the 
biological impairment under workers‘ compensation.  
C. ADAAA: Restoring Medical Impairment or Resisting 
Social/Biological Division?  
The ADAAA directly overrules social constructivist 
interpretations by explicitly prohibiting consideration of mitigating 
measures in determining whether a person satisfies the definition of 
disability.
172
 What matters for the threshold determination of 
disability status is the presumed underlying biological condition, 
without considering how the presumed effect of that condition on 
social functioning might be lessened by the use of assistive devices, 
medical treatment or services, compensating behavior or functional 
capacities.
173
 In part, this definition seems to focus protection on a 
fixed biological condition measured in terms of apparently 
unmediated functional impact. The ADAAA pushes back against the 
Court‘s social constructivist reasoning by clarifying the functional 
impact that defines impairment: the major life activities counting as 
normal functioning include not just socially relevant behaviors such 
as working, dressing, talking, and walking, but also physiological 
processes like normal cell growth, immunity, and reproduction.
174
 In 
addition, it clarifies that an impairment that is episodic or in 
remission qualifies as a protected disability if it would substantially 
limit a major life activity when active, again recognizing an 
underlying biological status even when that status is not fixed.
175
  
Nonetheless, the ADAAA to some extent resists the medical 
model of disability by partly displacing individual biology as the core 
constraint subject to protection against discrimination. The ADAAA 
 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2009); see also ADA Amendments Acts of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3556 (specifying the amendments‘ purpose of overturning 
the Supreme Court‘s rulings); Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 204 (2008) (explaining the concerns and efforts leading to this 
statutory reversal of the decisions narrowing the definition of disability). 
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i). The ADAAA specifies one exception for the use of 
―ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses,‖ so that a normal eyeglass-wearer is deemed to have 
normal functioning rather than identity as disabled. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii).  
 174. Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B). 
 175. Id. § 12102(4)(D). 
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overrides the Court‘s cramped approach to the ―regarded as‖ prong of 
the disability definition. It provides, somewhat awkwardly, that the 
―regarded as‖ definitional prong is satisfied by a showing that an 
actual impairment is perceived without the need to further show that 
this impairment is regarded as substantially limiting a major life 
activity.
176
 This clarification recognizes that the harm of false or 
irrational perceptions of disability can be about problematic 
externally imposed social status, not just mistaken ideas about 
specific individual functional failures.  
The Act also specifically restricts employment criteria based on 
uncorrected vision,
177
 thereby taking a step toward changing the focus 
of social construction of disability status from the question of 
whether a biologically impaired individual can nonetheless act 
normal to the question of whether facially neutral and normal social 
policies and structures can nonetheless be dysfunctional. Finally, the 
ADAAA prohibits discrimination against ―a qualified individual on 
the basis of disability,‖178 replacing the prior prohibition on 
discriminating against ―a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual.‖179 This change displaces 
the individual‘s status as the essential source of the problematic 
treatment and more directly emphasizes that such a status can be the 
contingent result of external imposition of unjust limitations. More 
generally, the ADAAA affirms Congress‘s intent to shift the focus of 
the law from deciding who is ―really‖ disabled to deciding whether 
discrimination on the basis of disability has occurred.
180
  
Nonetheless, the ADAAA partly continues to focus on sorting 
biological from social status. It explicitly removes any substantive 
accommodation requirement for those plaintiffs who rest their 
disability status on social construction under the ―regarded as‖ prong, 
rather than on proof of sufficient actual functional limitation.
181
 This 
change risks entrenching the bifurcation of disability into formal and 
substantive equality tracks in a way that undermines both. In the 
 
 176. Id. § 12102(3)(A). 
 177. Id. § 12113(c). 
 178. Id. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). 
 179. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557. 
 180. See id. at 3553–54. 
 181. Id. at 3557–58. 
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implicit logic of this change, if the disadvantage at issue involves 
social status rather than a real functional limitation, then no 
―substantive‖ social change is necessary to alleviate that 
disadvantage. In this narrow view, without a ―real‖ biological 
limitation relevant to social functioning, equality need only ensure 
that the person perceived as disabled is treated the same as those not 
so perceived. However, as critical theory has shown outside the 
context of disability, the line dividing formal equality from 
substantive accommodation is slippery and subjective, so that efforts 
to require neutral treatment will often seem like demands for 
undeserved special accommodation.  
For example, prior to the ADAAA, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that 
the ADA could require an employer to make reasonable 
accommodations for a plaintiff who could only establish her status as 
disabled under the ―regarded as‖ prong of the Act‘s disability 
definition.
182
 The plaintiff had successfully performed her job as a 
product transporter in a fish factory despite suffering from vertigo.
183
 
The court decided she did not establish an actual disability within the 
meaning of the statute because of a lack of evidence of any 
impairment other than her ability to stare continuously at moving 
objects.
184
 Nonetheless, the court agreed that her lack of ―real‖ 
disability status did not bar her claim for a workplace accommodation 
after a new supervisor modified her job to include conveyor belt 
work, which she argued was not essential to her position as product 
transporter.
185
 The court‘s decision recognizes that employment 
policies appearing neutral on their face and as applied—such as the 
decision to restructure factory work duties—might sometimes be 
imposed without substantial legitimate reason, thereby rendering a 
person disabled who might not otherwise be.
186
 For example, the new 
supervisor may have imposed the conveyor belt duties over the fish 
 
 182. D‘Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 183. Id. at 1222.  
 184. Id. at 1226–27, 1234. 
 185. Id. at 1234–39. 
 186. The court supported its reasoning by referring to a Supreme Court ruling requiring 
consideration of reasonable accommodations for a teacher who satisfied only the ―regarded as‖ 
definitional prong of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, on which the ADA was modeled. Id. 
at 1236.  
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factory worker‘s objections, not out of real evidence of (or concern 
for) any impact on factory productivity, but simply because of 
irrational fear, disgust, or callous indifference toward the plaintiff 
based on her perceived bodily weakness or abnormality.  
Under the ADAAA, the ―regarded as‖ status could preclude 
judicial scrutiny of such job policies and structures, so that, 
ironically, workers‘ lack of real disability would in some cases mean 
their employment disadvantages are attributed to real individual 
biological impairment rather than social stereotypes. Disability rights 
advocates argue that the expanded definition of actual disability 
means many such plaintiffs nonetheless will have a right to 
reasonable accommodation on the ground that they have sufficiently 
substantial real physiological impairments.
187
 For example, because 
episodic impairments are included under the actual disability prong, 
and because bodily functions are included as major life activities, a 
plaintiff‘s vertigo could reasonably be deemed a ―real‖ rather than 
perceived disability.
188
 But this means the amendments will partly 
work to reinforce emphasis on the individual person‘s ―real‖ 
functional failure rather than on workplace bias.  
In addition, some biological conditions—like facial scars—may 
arguably have no impact on ―real‖ bodily functioning but may be 
particularly susceptible to harmful prejudice.
189
 Although the 
expanded ―regarded as‖ prong will extend coverage to those whose 
disability is more clearly a perceived status than a real function, 
without the ―reasonable accommodation‖ requirement, the 
substantive protection provided is less clear. A retail store policy 
requiring employees to have straight teeth and unscarred skin might 
readily be understood as discrimination based on perceived disability 
rather than on ―real‖ and relevant job qualifications. As Christine Joll 
has discussed, these cases most obviously blur the purported line 
between formal and substantive equality, because changing such 
policies may have substantive costs for employers in a society where 
stereotypes of disability are pervasive (such as customers‘ judgments 
 
 187. Feldman et al., supra note 172, at 237–38 & n.184. 
 188. See id. at 238. 
 189. See Anderson, supra note 161, at 1044 (providing an alternative reading of perceived 
impairment). 
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linking the value of retail products to salesclerks‘ ability to embody a 
―normal‖ or even ―perfect‖ appearance). That blurry, and ultimately 
incoherent, line between ―formal‖ bans on discrimination and 
substantive accommodation creates some risk that courts may treat 
challenges to such overtly prejudicial status-based policies as 
requests for affirmative accommodation outside the bounds of the 
amended law‘s ―regarded as‖ prong.190 To clearly reach these 
egregious examples of unequal treatment—based purely on status 
regardless of physiological function—we need to move equality 
beyond the division between ―real‖ biological difference and 
contingent social overlay.  
IV. MAKING SUBSTANTIVE SOCIAL CHANGE NORMATIVE  
The medical model of disability powerfully impedes efforts to 
challenge pervasive substantive injustice by ascribing functional 
disadvantages primarily to real and relevant individual deficient 
status. Yet as Plessy demonstrated in the context of race, the move to 
a social constructivist model can reinforce that barrier by making 
status-based harm seem insubstantial—a contingent choice or 
subjective attitude.
191
Unless disadvantaged individuals face perfectly 
determinate biological constraints, placing the burden of change on 
the disadvantaged individual will tend to seem substantively easier 
and less costly than changing the external social environment (except 
when the social harm is also highly individualized in the form of 
isolated intentional bad actions).  
Adam Samaha argues that the shift from a medical to a social 
model of disability‘s causes does not, in itself, justify a shift in the 
public policy response to disability.
192
 He argues that stronger legal 
protections require further analysis of moral principles explaining 
why socially caused harm to people with disabilities should lead to 
societal duties to correct that harm.
193
 This Article suggests a more 
fundamental intellectual problem with the focus on disability‘s 
 
 190. See Bagenstos, supra note 46.  
 191. See Bagenstos, supra note 46, at 452–54.  
 192. See Samaha, supra note 3, at 1253. 
 193. Id. at 1284–85. 
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causation. Equality is hindered not so much by the lack of principled 
support for social change. The greater barrier is the prevailing 
assumption that the question of changing the status quo does not 
deserve serious intellectual or legal scrutiny. For disability and other 
disadvantaged identities, rigorous inquiry into the merits of 
substantive social change tends to be undermined by stereotypes, 
animus, indifference, or self-interest on the part of those who benefit 
from the status quo. The questions and presumptions that frame the 
moral debate about social change are as important as the moral 
principles applied within the debate.  
The social model of disability provides a vital step in opening the 
door to more serious analysis of social change by helping us imagine 
that perhaps things could be substantively different, and dramatically 
so. The harms of the status quo might be neither fully determined by 
individual nature nor a fully random and neutral fact of life 
undeserving of our attention, debate, and action.
194
 Nonetheless, the 
social model can block consideration of social change when 
presented as a supplement to a biological model within an 
overarching framework designed to sort ―real‖ from ―contingent‖ 
status. In the context of disability, that division between social 
functioning and biological status has helped foreclose a rigorous 
substantive debate about ―who should change‖ by leading us into a 
rationally dubious debate about ―who is really disabled.‖ 
If we start instead with the presumption that individual biological 
and social identity and functioning are thoroughly entangled and 
inseparable, we might better evaluate the merits of social change in 
the context of disability and beyond. Formal equality should prohibit 
not just differentiation based on socially irrelevant biological 
appearances but also differentiation that is highly relevant to 
illegitimate substantive social goals, such as the bare desire to 
harm.
195
 By collapsing wrongful discrimination into the problem of 
patently purposeless attention to biological form, the conventional 
 
 194. See Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641, 657 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) 
(explaining the value of critical theory in general as imagining that things could be better).  
 195. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 848–70 (explaining that prohibitions on ―rational‖ 
discrimination are central to antidiscrimination law).  
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formal equality scale narrows our view of antidiscrimination to 
blindness toward individual identity, blocking our attention to 
structural change.  
When we reorient the antidiscrimination principle away from a 
fundamental separation between biological status and social 
functioning, disability is not so clearly relegated to the bottom of the 
formal equality scale. If the question is not which physical 
differences are socially irrelevant, but which socially interpreted 
physical differences are relevant to legitimate substantive social 
functions, then the ―real‖ functional differences of disability can be 
just as susceptible to prejudicial differentiation as the illusory 
functional differences of racial identity. A stairs-only entrance to a 
recently renovated courthouse could be as much a problem of formal 
unequal treatment as a whites-only sign on that same entrance. For 
example, that design could be due to the illegitimate assumption that 
wheelchair users are not normal courthouse users, or to the biased 
assumption that facilitating wheelchair users‘ normal, visible 
entrance would threaten a traditional appearance of dignity and order.  
Further, rejecting the biological versus social division would help 
undermine the presumption that protected disability status should be 
presumptively and naturally limited to those with real or perceived 
impairments. If biological and social status are intertwined, then a 
direct social identity as disabled—just like a socially imposed 
identity as nonwhite—can be the object of illegitimate differentiation 
even when the substantive biological content of that identity is 
unarticulated or ambiguous.  
Finally, an integrated social and biological view of 
antidiscrimination could help bolster the formal equality scale itself, 
not just raise disability‘s position on that scale. As Robert Hayman 
and Nancy Levit have astutely analyzed, the assumption of a 
biological essence separable from social functioning limits the theory 
and doctrine of race discrimination.
196
 Although the conventional 
equality framework presumes that racial differentiation reflects 
suspect social construction, it positions this social construction as an 
 
 196. Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, Un-Natural Things: Constructions of Race, 
Gender, and Disability, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
159, 177–81 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002). 
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overlay on a ―real‖ physical essence. This biological/social division 
helps narrow formal racial equality to colorblindness by making it 
seem that the harm of racism disappears once we turn our gaze from 
irrelevant physical differences like ―color‖ toward relevant social 
functioning. If we instead position ―real‖ racial identity as social as 
well as biological, then it is easier to see that the ―race‖ 
classifications deserving scrutiny for prejudice should be expanded to 
include facially neutral functional criteria with racially disparate 
impact.
197
 This is not because racially disparate functioning has any 
biological basis. Rather, if race is understood as a social category tied 
to but not solely determined by physiological features, problematic 
racial discrimination can operate through ideas about social 
functioning that do not explicitly or consistently reference particular 
biological features.  
Substantive equality can also be strengthened by rejecting the 
biological/social frame. In the conventional view, substantive 
disadvantage tends to collapse into constraints on individual agency. 
The medical model emphasizes biological limits, while the social 
model emphasizes the social limits preventing individuals from 
succeeding despite biological limitations. This means both sides tend 
to skew the debate toward the question of individuals‘ limits rather 
than toward the question of the merits of social change. Both sides of 
this divide risk reinforcing the premise that individual physiological 
weaknesses are abnormal individual failures, and that individuals 
who cannot overcome those failures are abnormally dependent on 
social or legal assistance. Moreover, both sides of the divide focus on 
excusing individuals of responsibility for their disadvantages in order 
to defend shifting to others the burden of alleviating those 
disadvantages (through compensation or accommodation). By doing 
so, both approaches risk reinforcing the presumption that social 
change alleviating those disadvantages will be burdensome rather 
than beneficial.  
Martha Fineman‘s theory of substantive equality as support for 
widely shared vulnerability provides an alternative to both sides of 
 
 197. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 299 
(1971) (explaining that protection against facially neutral criteria with disparate racial impact 
reflects the fact that such criteria are often the functional equivalent of race).  
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this divide.
198
 Following her model, we need not sort biological from 
social harm or essential from contingent incapacity in order to justify 
social support for alleviating the harm of vulnerability.
199
 Instead, 
Fineman suggests a vision where the question of who should change 
begins from the assumption that vulnerable persons are normal and 
valued members of society.
200
 Fineman analyzes the ideal of 
individual autonomy as a myth used to penalize societal support for 
some people‘s limitations and needs while privileging support for 
others.
201
 By replacing this myth with the premise of human 
vulnerability, we can better recognize affirmative public support for 
physical and social disadvantage as pervasive and fundamental to 
overall societal well-being, not an exceptional response to those 
whose incapacity is essentially biological or essentially social.
202
  
Applying this vulnerability theory to disability rights, Ani Satz 
explains how a civil rights analysis of disability blends into questions 
of social welfare policy.
203
 Consistent with that view, this Article‘s 
comparison between workers‘ compensation and the ADA shows 
how neither equality rights nor social welfare goals will provide 
strong support for substantive social change without challenging the 
premises underlying both.  
The focus of substantive support must shift away from defining 
social change as costly ―redistribution‖ or ―accommodation‖ and then 
limiting those costs by narrowing the definition of ―real‖ 
vulnerability. Instead, meaningful equality and social justice requires 
more careful evaluation of the costs and benefits of substantive 
support for those whose identities as ―different‖ or ―impaired‖ have 
 
 198. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).  
 199. See id. at 8–9 (discussing vulnerability as a recognition of socially mediated universal 
embodiment focusing on shared potential for dependency rather than distinguishing dependent 
from independent persons). 
 200. See id. at 10–15.  
 201. Id. at 19; see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A 
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 49–52 (2004). 
 202. See id. at 20–22 (advocating an approach to equality premised on the state obligation 
to respond to vulnerabilities with equal regard and provide individuals meaningful opportunities 
to develop their assets in the face of inevitable human vulnerability).  
 203. Satz explores an approach blending social welfare and antidiscrimination. Ani B. Satz, 
Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 550–66 
(2008).  
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elicited systematic social prejudice and exclusion. The presumption 
that modifying buses to provide wheelchair access involves 
―abnormal‖ substantive costs depends on an unexamined baseline 
decision that fails to count the costs of first deciding to build an 
inaccessible bus or the costs of providing seats compared to 
wheelchair securement devices.
204
 Similarly, compensating injured 
workers for actual work loss may seem less costly than compensating 
―impairment‖ if we consider that higher compensation could increase 
incentives for increasing long-term savings through greater safety or 
workplace accommodations for injured workers. Elizabeth Emens 
shows how prevailing approaches to the ADA fail to sufficiently 
consider how reasonable accommodations often bring a range of 
substantial social benefits to others.
205
 These benefits go beyond the 
particular person defined as disabled to include, for instance, 
improved working conditions for presumably nondisabled or 
differently disabled coworkers, enhanced productivity to employers 
from reduced job turnover or from technological innovation, and 
reduced irrational social stigma and stereotyping of disability.
206
 The 
idea of universal design goes further than the concept of 
―accommodation‖ to shift the focus to how the social environment 
can be constructed to better respond to a broad range of particular 
human capacities and incapacities, for the benefit of all.
207
  
Neither the ADA‘s shift to civil rights nor a return to social 
welfare will open the question of substantive social change to serious 
normative debate without moving beyond a biological/social inquiry. 
For both equality and social welfare policy, the analysis should move 
away from scrutinizing individuals for failure, whether biological or 
social, or whether identified as low functioning or low status. Instead, 
the emphasis should be on more seriously considering the benefits of 
 
 204. See Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 868–69 (explaining that changing the time frame of 
analysis reveals many of the apparently ―real‖ costs of substantive change are instead the 
product of biased attitudes); McCluskey, supra note 5, at 880 & n.119 (noting a case where 
calculations of cost were scrutinized for social bias and the court found that providing 
wheelchair access to city buses was not more costly than constructing inaccessible buses). 
 205. Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodations, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 839, 845–48 
(2008). 
 206. See id. at 846–58 (summarizing types of ―second party‖ and ―third party‖ benefits).  
 207. Satz, supra note 203, at 542. 
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restructuring social institutions to better alleviate both physiological 
and social disadvantages for more people. 
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